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A War That Never Ends:
Internal Conflicts, External Interventions, and the Civil Wars in Afghanistan

Chang-Dae David Hyun
University of Toronto
(Toronto, Canada)

The civil war in Afghanistan lasted for over two decades until it finally came to
an end in 2001. During this horrific period of time, two million Afghan were killed and
over five million fled the country. 1 Many families lost their livelihood and beloved ones
while the entire country has been suffering from socio-economic and political meltdown.
It brings to our attention why there was such a catastrophic event in the past and how the
civil war is still impacting Afghanistan today. It is difficult to analyze a single cause for
the Afghanistan civil war because it involves different circumstances and different actors
associated with it. But the most consistent trend is that the Afghanistan civil war was
catalyzed by internal conflicts and exacerbated by external actors. This pattern of internal
conflict followed by external intervention repeated itself during the civil war between
1978 and 2001 and even during the peace-making process of post-2001.
Three phases of the Afghanistan civil war will be discussed in this paper. During
the first phase from 1978 to 1989, the Afghan Communist Party, the People’s Democratic
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Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), triggered the Afghanistan civil war. However, the war
exacerbated when external actors—the Soviet, the United States, and Muslim
communities—joined the war. When external players left Afghanistan in 1989, the civil
war became an internal conflict again. From 1989 to 2001 in the second phase, the civil
war started with internal conflicts based on ethnic differences. However, the war was
exacerbated by “bad neighbors” who supported different ethnic groups that are related to
their own ethnic representations. The civil war ended with the U.S. intervention that
eventually removed the Talban and “bad neighbors” from power in 2001. However, the
peace-making process has not been very successful because ethnic divisions still create
internal conflicts while the U.S. exacerbates these conflicts by favoring certain groups
over others. In a concluding remark, alternatives to end the vicious cycle in Afghanistan
today will be suggested.

Cold War from 1978 to 1989

Since the end of World War II in 1945, Afghanistan monarchy carried out rapid
modernization. Many countries around the world contributed massive amounts of foreign
aid to Afghanistan, so that the country can become a buffer zone between the Soviet and
the U.S.-controlled Pakistan. By the 1970s, more than twenty nations operated bilateral
aid including the U.S, all Western European countries, most of Eastern European
communists, and wealthy Muslim nations.2 The King Zahir and the Prime Minister
Daoud utilized the capital to reform the country by paving roads, establishing air
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connections, opening up telecommunications, diversifying agricultural industries and
expanding education system. 3 Consequently, the middle class grew largely from a few
hundred to nearly 100,000 during these periods. 4 However, rapid modernization created
greater instability because growing literacy rate outpaced available opportunities by large.
Between 1965 to 1973, many secondary school graduates were unable to receive higher
education because expansion of secondary schools outpaced expansions of universities. 5
Furthermore, massive migrants moved from the countryside to cities and started to put
pressure on the job market with increased competition. These problems exacerbated when
Western aid fell dramatically after the Afghanistan monarchy failed to repay its debt to
foreign donors. 6
The Afghanistan civil war in 1978 started out as a conflict between two internal
factions. Specifically, the elites against the communists who mobilized popular support
based on the marginalized population. The communists, the PDPA, earned wide support
because the economic disparity was large between ordinary citizens and elites. According
to the “greed theory” interpreted by famous economist Herschel Grossman, revolutions
occur to “permanently change distribution of income through either an alteration of
existing property rights or the replacement of the ruling elites.” 7 In Afghanistan, greed of
ruling elites was a motivation for communist rebels to replace existing institutions. In the
midst of the economic crises and social instability of the 60s and 70s, opportunities were
skewed toward ruling elites. Mostly those who found jobs were from elite networks

3

Ibid, 42.
Ibid, 45.
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Hamidullah Amin and Gordon B. Schilz, A Geography of Afghanistan (University of Nebraska, Centre for
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7
Herschel I., Grossman, “Kleptocracy and Revolutions,” Oxford University Press 52, no. 2 (April, 1999):
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within Kabul or from powerful tribal families while majority of population remained
unemployed. 8 Students who were well-educated but marginalized by the structural
injustice, started to join the PDPA because the party promised equality and fair redistribution of income. Consequently, the PDPA played a large role when Prime Minister
Daoud overthrew the King Zahir in 1973. However, problems persisted even after the
new Republican government came to power. Daoud and its elite supporters remained
greedy while the majority of the population was marginalized from opportunities. Much
of the institutional weakness remained the same, economic crises further widened, and
unemployment rates were increasing. 9 However, instead of making concessions, Daoud
further pushed for oppressive means to strengthen its dictatorship; increased revenue for
public security, military and police. 10 Daoud initially suppressed the PDPA because the
PDPA was the strongest political opposition in the country. When Daoud began massive
purging of the PDPA leaders, the PDPA launched a coup in April 1978; 11 eventually, the
PDPA overthrew Daoud and established the Marxist regime for the first time in
Afghanistan.
Internal conflicts persisted even in the new Marxist regime because of an
ideological split within the communist party. The PDPA was separated into moderate
faction Parcham and radical faction Khalq; the former wanted to promote moderate
reforms under the current system; and the latter wanted to promote radical reforms by
destroying the existing system. 12 Eventually, the Khalq who occupied more powerful
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Nancy Peabody Newell and Richard S. Newell, The Struggle for Afghanistan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
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positions in the government defeated Parcham. 13 Shortly after, the Khalq implemented
radical reforms which triggered nation-wide resentments. Peasants were discontent with
land reforms, which required transfer of 3 million acres of land to approximately 300,000
poor farming families. 14 Most owners refused to plant their fields in fear of expropriation
and tenants were reluctant to receive land due to Islamic prohibitions against taking the
property of others. 15 Consequently, the harvest dropped by one-third of previous year
during the spring of 1979. 16 Food shortages resulted in the Heart Uprising of March
1979, which ended up killing nearly 5,000 Khalq officials and Soviet residents. 17 The
rebellion started to spread in many other cities and even soldiers mutinied in Jalabad
against the Khalq government. 18 These crises led to further conflicts because the two
leaders of Khalq disagreed over handling disputes: The President, Taraki, wanted to
include secular resistance groups in politics so that dissidents could voice their grievances
through politics rather than physical violence; however, the Prime Minister, Amin,
wanted more totalitarian control over rebels using forces based on the few loyal-Marxist
members. 19 These disagreements led Taraki to make an assassination attempt on Amin in
September 1979. 20 However, the attempt failed and Amin declared himself as the sole
leader of Afghanistan after killing Taraki.
Civil war within Afghanistan exacerbated when external actors joined the war
between 1979 and 1989. Initially, it was the Soviet invasion of 1979 that marked the

13

Ibid, 74.
Ibid, 81.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid, 85.
18
Ibid, 86.
19
Ibid, 88.
20
Odd Arne Westad, “Prelude to Invasion: The Soviet Union and the Afghan Communists, 1978-1979,”
International History Review 16, no.1 (1994): 61-62.
14

Published by Digital Commons@Georgia Southern, 2018

68

Armstrong Undergraduate Journal of History, Vol. 8 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 6

beginning of larger- scaled civil war. The Soviet’s intervention could be explained by the
Brezhnev Doctrine established by Leonid Brezhnev, who was the Soviet’s leader between
1964 to 1982. He argued that in the event of a threat to the communist rule, it is the duty
of any Socialist nation-state to come to the fraternal assistance of any other socialist
nation. 21 The Soviets considered Afghan’s communist regime weakened by nation-wide
resistance and were disappointed by the Afghan government’s inability to resolve issues
alone. During the massive peasant uprising against the Khalq regime, the Soviet
supported 5,000 Russian military advisers, and MI-24 helicopter gunships. 22 However,
rebels were getting much stronger while the government further weakened by a split in
their leadership. Furthermore, the Soviets distrusted the new leadership under Amin,
which compounded problems in Afghanistan. The Soviets were suspicious of Amin’s
relationship with the U.S. who at the time was the Soviet’s enemy of the Cold War. The
KGB officers spread rumours that Amin, who had been educated at Columbia University
in New York, had been recruited by the CIA. Furthermore, Amin’s meeting with the
American chargé d'affaires, in Kabul during the autumn of 1979, fueled the Soviet’s
suspicions. 23 These suspicions motivated the Soviets to intervene in Afghanistan, whose
communist leadership was significantly weakened by internal conflicts. On December 25,
1979, the Soviets sent 75,000 troops to Afghanistan, marching from northern provinces
toward Kabul. 24 Within two days, they reached the presidential palace in Kabul and

21
Reza Hasmath, “The Utility of Regional Jus Cogens,” (American Political Science Association Annual
Meeting, New Orleans, USA, August 30- September 2, 2012): 8.
22
Ibid, 87.
23
Germaint Hughes, “The Soviet-Afghan War, 1978-1989: An Overview,” Defence Studies 8, no. 3
(September, 2008): p.332.
24
Ibid.
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ended up killing Amin. Immediately after, the Soviet established the puppet government
led by Parcham leaders who led the country until 1989.
The intervention of an external actor, the Soviet Union, into Afghanistan’s
internal conflict inevitably heightened the conflict in Afghanistan into a global conflict
mirroring the chief ideological divisions of the time: The Cold War. The U.S. intervened
in Afghanistan’s civil war to resist against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The U.S.
involvement could be explained by the Democratic Domino Theory. Democratic Domino
Theory was conceptualized by Peter T. Leeson, and Andrea M. Dean: They argue that
increases or decreases in democracy in one country will spread and “infect neighboring
countries.” 25 The U.S. under the Ronald Reagan administration, was particularly
concerned about the decrease of democracy that may end up infecting the region with
communism. Moreover, the region that was at stake of a spill-over was a geostrategically important location, the Persian Gulf, which was critical for America’s oil
consumption. 26 Consequently, under the Carter and Reagan administrations, the U.S.
provided a total of $2.15 billion worth of aid to Afghanistan’s rebel groups. 27
Furthermore, the U.S.’s channelling of weapons, such as American Stinger anti-aircraft
(AA) missile that helped rebels to fight the Soviet’s aircraft, is sometimes considered a
significant factor that led to the defeat of Soviet troops. 28
The Cold War conflict was complicated by the interventions of other Muslim
states from the region. Thus, the Cold War conflict took on a religious dimension that

25
Peter T. Leeson, and Andrea M. Dean, “The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical Investigation,”
American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 3 (July 2009): 533.
26
Germaint Hughes, “The Soviet-Afghan War, 1978-1989: An Overview,” Defence Studies 8, no. 3
(September 2008): 333.
27
Ibid: 335.
28
Ibid.
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reflected the religious divisions of the region. Countries including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,
and Iran joined the Afghanistan civil war in pursuit of Islamic fundamentalists. These
Muslim states were united with Afghanistan’s rebel groups under the Jihadism, which
means having holy struggle to achieve Islam fundamentals. 29 They were willing to
sacrifice their lives to liberate Islamic countries and to protect Islamic fundamentals
against foreign invaders. According to a famous American journalist, William Blum,
Muslim warriors gathered to struggle against godless atheistic communists in
Afghanistan. 30 Amongst those Muslim supporters, significant participants were Saudi
Arabia’s billionaire Osama Bin Laden who organized Al-Qaeda; Saudi Arabia’s
monarchy that matched the U.S. aid of $2.15 billion; Pakistan’s Inter-Services
Intelligence Agency (ISI) that channeled the American aid into Afghanistan. 31
Growing external supports of Afghanistan’s rebel groups shifted the balance of
power against Afghanistan’s communist puppet government. Afghanistan’s rebel groups,
also known as the mujahedeen (Islam Jihadist warriors), grew rapidly to reach 90,000 to
500,000 members. 32 They were exceptionally successful in waging a guerilla warfare
focusing on attacking supply routes and Soviet convoys and outposts. Moreover,
mujahedeen conducted sabotage attacks against airbases, power stations, government
buildings, and assassinated PDPA officials. 33 On the other hand, Afghanistan’s
government had been struggling to repress mujahedeen resistance. There was a lack of
coordination between the Soviets and the puppet government because the Soviets were
29

Hans Wehr, Edited by J M. Cowan, Arabic-English Dictionary (Wiesbaden, Germany: Otto Harrassowitz,
1994).
30
William Blum, Killing hope: U.S military and CIA interventions since world war II (Monroe, ME:
Common Courage Press, 2004), 347.
31
Germaint Hughes, “The Soviet-Afghan War, 1978-1989: An Overview,” Defence Studies. 8, no. 3
(September, 2008): 335-336.
32
Ibid: 340.
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suspicious of mujahedeen informants within the government. But more importantly, the
Soviets were not able to root out small-scaled and dispersed mujahedeen guerilla
resistance in the mountainous regions of Afghanistan. The Soviet’s only leverage was the
Air Force but it was undermined when the U.S. provided AA missiles to the
mujahedeen. 34 By December of 1986, the CIA estimated that the Soviets had lost $40
million in Afghanistan since its occupation. 35 The Soviet occupation in Afghanistan came
to an end when Gorbachev ordered the Soviet’s retreat, which was completed by
February of 1989. 36 Immediately after, the U.S. also retreated from Afghanistan, creating
a power vacuum in the country. It put an end to, two decades of conflicts that initially
began with internal ideological division; but grew to a larger-scale after interventions by
global hegemons.

Ethnic War from 1989 to 2001

The civil war became largely internal again in 1989 when the Soviet’s puppet
government was left alone to face mujahedeen groups. Initially, the Najibullah
government led an effective defense against the mujahedeen resistance. They benefitted
from the Soviet’s 300 airframes that were left behind during the evacuation; 37 and when
mujahedeen attacked Jalalabad in March 1989, these airframes played a key role by
killing 3000 out of 10,000 mujahedeen. 38 Meanwhile, the mujahedeen groups lacked

34

Ibid.
Ibid: 342.
36
Rachel Dry and Alice Crites, “How Not to end a war,” The Washington Post, July 17, 2017,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2007/07/17/GR2007071700070.html.
37
Shane A. Smith, Afghanistan after the Occupation: examining the Post-Soviet Withdrawal and the
Najibullah Regime it left behind, 1989-1992 (Tampa, FL: Phi Alpha Theta, 2014), 337.
38
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35
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coordination amongst each other. American journalist, George Crile, described in 1991
that “each year it seemed that Najibullah only grew stronger and the mujahedeen only
more divided, less attractive, and even maybe dangerous.” 39 However, the collapse of the
Soviet Union in late 1991 played a critical role in changing the course of the warfare.
Already in a deteriorated economy, Najibullah’s government faced serious financial
restraints after the Soviet aid was stopped. Consequently, the government was unable to
fuel many of its aircrafts and military supply ran dry. 40 The problem exacerbated when
Najibullah dismissed a few of his military commanders whom he distrusted due to ethnic
differences. Those discriminated commanders with the Tajik and the Uzbek background
ended up joining rebels, which significantly shifted the balance of power against the
government. 41 Eventually on April 1992, Najibullah was removed from power.
Internal conflicts continued because of the ‘peace spoiler’ that ruined the peacemaking process. An American professor, Andrew Reiter, uses the term ‘peace-spoiler’ to
describe “the use of violence or threats of violence in an overt attempt to derail or
obstruct a signed civil war peace agreement, or to modify its provisions or
implementations.” 42 In the case of Afghanistan, peace-making attempts by mujahedeen
rebels were undermined by the “peace spoiler”, Hekmatyar. Hekmatyar, who was the
leader of the largest rebel group (the Pashtun), discredited the Peshawar Accord that
proposed power-sharing amongst mujahedeen rebel groups. He wanted to spoil the peace
and to destroy enemies so that he could declare himself the sole leader of the country.

39
George Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story of How the Wildest Man in Congress and a
Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History of Our Times (New York: Grove Press, 2003), 518.
40
Ibid, 328.
41
Ibid, 329.
42
Andrew G Reighter, Fighting over peace: spoilers, peace agreements, and the strategic use of violence
(Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillain, 2016), 7.
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When Hekmatyar was asked to attend the Peshawar Accord, he responded “we will
march into Kabul with our naked sword. No one can stop us … Why should we meet the
leaders?” 43 Even Osama Bin Laden, who worked extensively with Hekmatyar at the time,
urged him to “go back to your brothers” but Hekmatyar refused to do so because he was
confident in winning a war against his opponents. 44
Internal conflicts persisted based on different ethnic representations of
Afghanistan. During this time, the civil war continued in the form of an ethnic war
between the Pashtun and non-Pashtuns. Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group has been the
Pashtun that includes 38% to 43% of the population; the second largest group has been
the Tajik that constituted 20% of the population; then, Uzbek has been the third largest
group that includes 13% of population; the Hazara contained 8% to 10% of population;
and small ethnic groups made up the rest of the population. 45 The war was fought
between Pashtun led by Hekmatyar against the interim government including the Tajik
leader, Massoud; the Uzbek leader, Dostum; and the Hazara leader, Mazari. 46 The ethnic
conflict can be explained by the ‘grievance theory,’ described by Paul Koellier and Anke
Hoeffler. They state that “rebellion occurs when grievances are acute that people want to
engage in violent protests.” 47 Although there was economic greed that motivated rebel
groups to compete for resources, the grievances such as ethnic and religious factionalism

43

Marcela Grad, Massoud: An Intimate Portrait of the Legendary Afghan Leader (Saint Louis, MO:
Webster University Press, 2009)
44
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45
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46
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exacerbated the ethnic conflict of 1992. 48 For several hundred years, Afghanistan’s more
than fourteen ethnic groups have been isolated from each other in a mountainous terrain
of the country; each group carrying out their own distinctive culture, history, language,
and religion. Thus, each ethnic group mobilized their own guerillas while competing for
power.
Civil war within Afghanistan exacerbated when neighboring countries supported
groups that shared similar ethnicity. The role of Afghanistan’s neighbors in the midst of
the ethnic war can be explained by the “bad neighbor theory.” An American professor,
Michael Brown, conceptualized the theory as “internal conflicts are often triggered by
external contagion or spillover effects from neighboring state.” 49 In the case of
Afghanistan, Pakistan supported the Pashtun, Iran supported the Hazara, Tajikstan
supported the Tajik and Uzbekistan supported the Uzbek. These neighboring states
wanted to exert their influence in Afghanistan by strengthening its own ethnic groups.
Their influence intensified when a massive influx of Afghanistan refugees reached their
country. Refugees were trained as “refugee warriors,” which is a term used by renowned
author Astri Suhrke; she describes the term as citizens of one state who fled the country
as a refugee and returns to their home state to struggle in a revolution. 50 These “refugee
warriors” include millions of Afghanistan refugees who entered Pakistan; 51 and a million
refugees who reached Iran during civil wars. After getting trained by neighboring states,

48

Ibid.
Michael Edward Brown, The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1996), 583.
50
Aristide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee
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these warriors were sent back to Afghanistan; consequently, fighting for their ethnic
groups during the civil war.
I will argue that Pakistan was the most salient external actor that prolonged the
civil war in Afghanistan. Pakistan had a special interest in the Afghanistan civil war
because they wanted to establish a Pashtun government in their neighboring state. When
Pakistan was channeling American aid to mujahedeen groups during the Soviet
occupation, Pakistan contributed the most aid to Hekmatyar. 52 Thus, Pakistan is partially
responsible for the Hekmatyar’s peace spoiling of the Peshwar Accord. But more
importantly, Pakistan played a significant role in creating the Taliban who became a
dominant force of the civil war. Since the 1980s, Pakistan worked together with Saudi
Arabia to establish religious schools near the borders between Afghanistan and
Pakistan. 53 The students who were trained in these religious schools became later known
as the Taliban. Pakistan government encouraged many Afghan refugees to join these
religious schools by providing free rooms for students and a monthly salary that could
support their family. 54 Consequently, the number of Taliban recruits grew exponentially.
The first Taliban movement started in late 1994, when the Taliban leader, Mohammed
Omar, rallied forces and occupied the Qandahar province to the south. 55 At this point, the
warfare between the Hekmatyar and interim governments was at a stalemate. The
Pakistan government started to view the Taliban as an alternative to Hekmatyar to
accomplish the establishment of a Pashtun-led Afghanistan. Pakistan increased support to
the Taliban, who started to sweep the southern part of the country. By September 1996,
52
Germaint Hughes, “The Soviet-Afghan War, 1978-1989: An Overview.” Defence Studies 8, no. 3
(September, 2008): 336.
53
Neamatollah Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 119.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid, 136-137.
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the Taliban defeated the interim government as well as wiping out forces loyal to
Hekmatyar. The oppositions to the Taliban fled to form the Northern Alliance including
Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras; however, by the end of 2000, only five percent of lands
were controlled by the Northern Alliance in a remote mountainous area while the rest
were strictly controlled by the Taliban. 56 The Northern Alliance could not wage a war
against the Taliban because they did not enjoy as much support as the Taliban did from
Pakistan. Although Iran was the largest contributor to the Northern Alliance and helped
to create the largest Shia organization in Afghanistan, 57 the differences between Shia and
Sunni beliefs further divided the Alliance. 58 Therefore, the fragmented Northern Alliance
that received much less support than the Taliban, was not a significant threat to the newly
created regime.
The civil war in Afghanistan came to an end due to the U.S. intervening in the
country after the 9/11 incident. On September 11, 2001, the heart of New York City was
destroyed by the terrorist attack that caused thousands of casualties and trillions of
dollars. 59 Immediately after, the CIA identified the suspects as members of Al Qaeda, led
by Osama Bin Laden. The U.S. urged the Taliban to extradite Bin Laden, however the
Taliban refused to hand him over to the U.S. Partially, because Bin Laden has been
Taliban’s closest ally and more importantly, they underestimated the U.S.’s power. At the
time, the Taliban judged the U.S.’s withdrawal from Somalia and Lebanon as signs of
weakness; therefore, they considered the U.S. would not be able to intervene in

56
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Afghanistan, whose solidarity was much stronger than those countries. 60 But, President
Bush famously declared, “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorist.” 61 The
dichotomy made the Taliban equal to terrorists and the enemy of the U.S. Two weeks
after 9/11, the CIA sent specialist to train the Northern Alliance so that the Northern
Alliance could wage an effective war on the ground. 62 Meanwhile, the U.S. Air Force
began heavy bombardment everywhere they spotted the Taliban. Although the Taliban
hid under tunnels and caves, the U.S. “bunker buster” would cremate them alive. 63 Those
few Taliban who managed to escape to the mountains of the North were slaughtered by
the Northern Alliance. 64 Within two months after U.S. intervention, the Taliban regime
was driven out of power. It put an end to a decade-long conflict that started with ethnic
differences; initially, internal ethnic divisions were later mirrored by external ethnic
divisions; therefore, external actors were prompt to meddle in Afghanistan’s affairs.

Peacebuilding after the War since 2001

The peace-making process heightened political conflicts in Afghanistan because it
could not resolve problems related to ethnic divisions. The Bonn Agreement took place
on December 5, 2001 led by the U.S., NATO, and warlords of the Northern Alliance.
They re-constructed Afghanistan’s institutions based on the Western legal system,
implementing in the Constitution, the Supreme Court and economy. 65 However, the Bonn

60

Mark Silinsky, The Taliban: Afghanistan’s Most Lethal Insurgents (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC,
2014), 45.
61
Ibid: 47.
62
Ibid, 47.
63
Ibid, 48.
64
Ibid, 50.
65
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Agreement discontented Pashtun tribes whose power was significantly reduced. 66
Meanwhile, non-Pashtuns enjoyed far greater representations in the government. Most of
the generals appointed for the new Ministry of Defense were non-Pashtuns; out of 38
positions, 37 are Tajiks and one Uzbek. 67 Furthermore, hatred amongst different ethnic
groups remained unresolved due to the lack of transitional justice. The warlords of the
Northern Alliance committed various crimes, including the massacre and rape of
Pashtuns. However, they were left unpunished and many of them are now leading the
government. Consequently, many ordinary Afghans still view the government as
illegitimate. Democracy with a multi-party system has shown little success in closing the
gaps between different ethnic groups. Nearly every small minority group formed its own
party and by 2009, a total of 110 parties were officially listed on the Ministry of Justice
website. 68 Consequently, during the 2005 parliamentary election, votes were split
between hundreds of candidates with many receiving tiny portions of the votes. 69 Thus,
none of the parties were able to win the majority vote, and likewise, majority will of the
citizens was not reflected in the winning coalitions.
The U.S. has been exacerbating the political conflict by favoring one group and
by corrupting a leader. During the Bonn Agreement, Hamid Karzai was appointed as a
leader of Afghanistan largely because he had strong connections to the U.S. 70 According
to Khali Roman, who was Karzai’s former Deputy Secretary between 2002 and 2005,

66

Carol J. Riphenburg. “Ethnicity and Civil Society in Contemporary Afghanistan,” Middle East Journal
59, no.1 (Winter 2005): 39.
67
Ibid: 42.
68
Ibid.
69
Ibid, 9-10.
70
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“tens of millions of dollars have flowed from the CIA to the office of Karzai.” 71
Although the CIA has declined to comment on this allegation, this money was perceived
as leverage for the U.S. to intervene in Afghanistan. According to Karzai’s affiliates,
Karzai used money to pay-off law makers; underwrite delicate diplomatic trips; bribe
during informal negotiations; and to give $100,000 monthly paychecks to the old Uzbek
warlord, Dostum. 72 Attention was brought to a secret CIA aid to Afghanistan’s president
by a U.S. Senator. In 2013, Senator Bob Corker of the Foreign Relations Committee said
he put a hold on $75 million intended for electoral programs in Afghanistan because the
Obama administration failed to respond to his request for explanation. 73 Consequently,
the rampant corruption was severely criticized by the opposition. According to the
corruption perception index of 2013, Afghanistan was ranked as 175 out of 177
countries. 74
The civil war in Afghanistan could have started again in 2014 after the vote
rigging.
After Karzai was removed from his office, the presidential election of 2014 fueled
tension between two presidential candidates. Afghanistan’s Independent Election
Committee announced the winner of the election as Ashraf Ghani who was Karzai’s
protege. But Abdullah Abdullah, who was a runner-up accused Ghani of vote-rigging;
because there was evidence that Ghani’s loyal supporters, election officials and
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stakeholders, manipulated and colluded many votes. 75 Furthermore, out of 20,561 polling
stations only 1964 stations were audited; and 810 stations were recounted; and 918
stations were disqualified. 76 The vote-rigging nearly put the country back into a civil war
based on ethnicity. Abdullah, who’s base was Tajik supporters, was planning a coup at
the time. 77 However, the coup was prevented because of the U.S.’s diplomatic
intervention: the U.S. Secretary of the State, John Kerry, arbitrated the dispute between
the two sides. 78 Both Ghani and Abduallah agreed to dual executive power. Eventually,
many praised the peaceful transfer of power in the country including President Obama,
who stated “the first democratic transfer of power in the history of that nation.” 79
However, this cannot be a permanent solution while fundamental problems remain intact.

Conclusion

Civil wars in Afghanistan are largely internal conflicts aggravated by external
actors. The initial phase of the civil war was triggered by the communists, who mobilized
popular support based on a marginalized population, eventually leading to a collapse of
the monarchy. Then, internal fighting within the communist regime de-stabilized the
country. However, the civil war grew to a larger-scale when external actors came into
play. The Soviets intervened in Afghanistan to consolidate communist leadership under
the Brezhev Doctrine; and the U.S. supported resistance groups to prevent a regional
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spill-over effect. Also, Muslim countries supported mujahedeen under the religious norm.
After external players left in 1989, the civil war became largely internal again. Initially, a
war between mujahedeen versus the Soviet’s puppet government has turned into an
ethnic war between Pashtun and non-Pashtun. The ethnic war exacerbated when “bad
neighbors,” especially Pakistan, supported groups that are connected to its own ethnicity.
Consequently, the Taliban grew out of religious schools in Pakistan, and eventually
wiped out its oppositions in the ethnic conflict. However, the U.S. intervention ended the
Taliban era. The peace-making process since 2001 has been largely obstructed by ethnic
divisions and rampant corruption. Multi-party democracy has shown little success while
the U.S. exacerbates political division by favoring one group over the other. The vicious
cycle of internal conflict that is exacerbated by external actors still continues today.
In going forward, the consociational democracy may break-off the vicious cycle. A
famous Dutch political scientist, Arend Lijphart, defines consociationalism as
“government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political
culture into a stable democracy.” 80 He argues that in a divided society the majoritarian
model creates further conflicts because it results in the excluding of certain groups.
Instead, consociationalism divides power equally amongst different groups through
constitutional agreements. 81 In Afghanistan, consociationalism could guarantee equal
power among ethnic groups whose jurisdiction could be protected by its own ethnic
leader. Each local groups such as Pashtun, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara, and other ethnic
minorities could have autonomous control over their local policies; equal redistribution of
funds from the central government to local governments assures them that the central
80
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government will carry out adequate fiscal policies for local governments; proportional
political representation guarantees their participation; and minority veto protects their
rights from the tyranny of a majority. 82 However, a precondition is necessary, which is a
cooperation between domestic elites; because if there is less internal conflict, external
actors may interfere less. Furthermore, global hegemons need to sympathize with small
countries whose lands are being used as a proxy war between superpowers.
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